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The International Criminal Court: Domesticating War in the Absence of Politics? 
 




The International Criminal Court (ICC), one of the world’s most prominent judicial bodies, was 
created in a similar fashion as other international institutions, through diplomatic negotiation and 
collaboration. However, what sets the ICC apart from these other international institutions is its 
attempt to escape from the politics it faces in the international arena by focusing solely on the 
law and legal proceedings. This is done because of the negative perception that arises when 
politics mixes with the law as it attempts to remain unbiased. The Court has faced challenges in 
this regard since its inception and the investigations it leads often blend the two key components 
of justice, a legal focus, and peace, a political focus. This essay examines the paradoxical 
relationship between law and politics in practice through the lens of international relations 
theory, as well as the politics surrounding the Court in both its creation and its internal 
functioning. Ultimately, the essay argues that the best example of politics enmeshed in the Court 
is through a focus on cases and the resulting political effects of the Court’s investigations are 
examined. The two cases studied are Uganda and Libya, chosen for their unique referral process 
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 The study of both law and politics, while being intertwined with one another for 
centuries, has developed into a unique relationship. In many respects, the unique character of this 
relationship is even more striking when one studies international politics and international law. 
As Reus-Smit (2004) points out, one only has to look at examples of the importance of 
understanding the legal right to resources in conflict zones, exemplified in the complex Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the resulting dispute of territorial access to water in the region, or the 
importance of juridical sovereignty on the international stage, to see the blend of these two 
disciplines (p.2). From the perspective of legal scholars and professionals, law and politics 
should be kept separate when it comes to the application of the law and the standards of legal 
justice. In order to further examine the character of this relationship, this paper will explore the 
inevitable politics that arise from judicial efforts in the international arena. It will do so by 
focusing on the International Criminal Court (ICC). As a legal institution that aspires to the 
highest recognized standards of international criminal justice, the Court’s main goal is often 
considered to be the pursuit of justice rather than the achievement of peace. Justice is considered 
to be the central goal in an ideal criminal justice system. As this essay will seek to demonstrate, 
this is not always the case with the ICC, as evidenced in the cases of Uganda and Libya. 
  
 Typically, the study of law and politics are seen as two separate fields. Reus-Smit (2004) 
notes that law is often viewed as an impartial regulatory framework designed to ensure rules are 
upheld (p.1), while in a general sense politics are focused on the creation and implementation of 
those rules, allocation of resources, and the struggle for power between actors (p.12). He argues 
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that understanding and applying these methods of analysis will help understand the shifting 
balance of power between international institutions and state sovereignty, as well as how politics 
constitute law, and in turn how law structures and disciplines politics (p. 4) This essay will 
examine the relationship between law and politics, specifically within the context of the ICC. 
While this essay is not aimed at producing a strict definition of what politics are in relation to 
law, in this paper, drawing from the work of authors such as Reus-Smit, I understand politics to 
be a power struggle between the ICC and other actors, as well actions aimed at pursuing one’s 
own political objectives over a general objective of international justice. Furthermore, I maintain 
that the ICC is connected to political outcomes due to its foundation and internal composition, 
but seeks to limit the effects of power politics in order to ensure justice as an ideal that can be put 
into practice on the international stage.  
  
 International humanitarian law (IHL) focuses on law to protect citizens from the effects 
of war, while also limiting the tools used by warring parties (Kalshoven and Zigfeld, 2011). IHL 
will be the body of international law examined in this essay due to the fact that it exemplifies the 
unique relationship between politics and the law. IHL, a set of legal rules and norms as outlined 
above, blends in with a political function of states: the ability to go to war. War is a political tool 
used by states to pursue power or protect their own civilians, and IHL seeks to constrain the rules 
of war through legal codification. As such, this paper explores IHL within the ICC’s 
investigations into Uganda and Libya. Both cases were chosen due to the differences in the 
manner in which the process of referral to the Court unfolded. Uganda utilized a state referral, 
which was preferable for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in order to avoid the appearance of 
violating sovereignty (Muller and Stegmiller, 2010, p.1269), while Libya, not party to the Court, 
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was referred on the basis of a binding Security Council resolution, Resolution 1970. Both of 
these cases will be examined more in depth in the essay.  
 
 The ICC was created to prosecute individuals rather than states for gross violations of 
IHL. With the creation of the Court through the Rome Statute, the highest standards of 
international law were to be upheld by the ICC. These standards include but are not limited to, 
the irrelevance of official capacity, the non-applicability of the statute of limitations, and 
individual criminal responsibility. These standards and legal justice as a whole are meant to 
ensure that political calculations do not invade the impartiality of justice and the application of 
the law. Politics should serve the legal process in order to avoid the perception that politics is 
hindering the applicability of justice and its core principles, such as fairness and due process. 
International humanitarian law, which as mentioned above seeks to constrain what is and is not 
allowable during war and conflict, has continued to expand since its inception in the early 19th 
century. The questions that this essay seeks to address are what are the limits and challenges of 
this attempt to constrain politics within the context of the ICC? What do the ICC cases of 
Uganda and Libya reveal in terms of the continued presence of politics and political calculations 
that surround the Court? These questions offer a particular insight into the unique relationship 
between politics and the law on the international stage, with a particular focus on IHL. By 
examining the cases of Uganda and Libya, as well as developing an analysis of how they relate 
to International Relations (IR) theory, this paper will argue that the International Criminal Court 
is a political institution in both its structure and function. While recognizing the inherent nature 
of the Court as a judicial body, the paper will further argue that the ICC, while created by legal 
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experts and politicians alike, is ultimately unable to escape or fully evacuate its involvement in 
the politics of the inter-state system, including the role played by non-state actors. 
 
 The content of the essay will first begin with an analysis of the ICC using three IR 
theories, followed by an examination of various scholarly perspectives on the politics of the ICC. 
Next it will, examine the developing relationship between law and politics more closely, which is 
followed by a focus on the internal power dynamics of the Court itself. Finally, the paper will 
focus on the cases of Uganda and Libya and the political effects the Court produced in those 
states.  
 
Examining the Politics of the ICC Through Various IR Theories 
 
 International Relations scholars have developed various theories and used them to apply 
ideas about how international actors such as states and institutions effect one another in various 
capacities. In many ways, the ICC is an ideal case to illustrate how theories of International 
Relations understand the relationship between law and politics in a general sense, as well as 
through a focus on international humanitarian law. While there are many different theoretical 
approaches one could take in order to best understand the politics of the ICC, this paper will 
focus on three.  
 
 To offer a perspective outside of the realm of international law, Cronin (2002) utilizes the 
example of the United Nations to explore two key concepts: intergovernmentalism and 
transnationalism. He draws the distinction that intergovernmentalism focuses on the overlapping 
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interests of member states such as security, while transnationalism focuses on humanitarian 
issues and human rights on the international stage, beyond simply inter-state relations. He argues 
that the UN is a balance of both, and that this focus shapes the future of global politics by 
allowing for a framework in which to further view international institutions, such as the 
International Criminal Court (pp. 53-54). IR theories offer useful analytical tools to help examine 
the politics enmeshed in the ICC, but on their own, they do not provide enough concrete 
evidence of the politics of the Court in practice. As a result it must be combined with cases to 
showcase the theories in specific states. To provide a foundational basis, a state-centric or realist 
approach will be examined first, as well as a constructivist lens, and finally an examination 




 Realism focuses on world politics with states as the key actors. States, according to 
realists, are constantly trying to maximize their own self-interest and power. The international 
arena observed through a realist lens is anarchic with a focus on surviving primarily through 
military capabilities. A realist scholar examining the International Criminal Court would adopt a 
state-oriented perspective, namely how individual states use the Court to pursue internationally 
their own interests and power. The most prominent example of a state attempting to use the 
institution of the ICC to pursue its own interests is the United States. This was evident when, 
during the creation of the Rome Statute, the US pushed for a Court subordinate to the Security 
Council where they retain political power. Under a realist perspective, states wish to maintain 
their own freedom and are reluctant to cede control to an international body. With the United 
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States, their veto power in the Security Council allows them to maintain that freedom and power, 
as well as the ability to more actively influence the aims and objectives on the international stage 
through its veto but also its ability to execute a referral or through its own domestic policy and 
rhetoric on the institution. Specifically, when the Security Council is examining a situation that 
the United States has an interest in or resources devoted to, the US can protect its own citizens 
and policies in the international arena through the use of the veto. With the ICC, the US does not 
have that same level of power to protect itself due to the composition of the Court.  Furthermore, 
while other states remain bound to the ICC, the United States retains the freedom to act on its 
own accord (Krisch, 2009, p.399). While the Rome Statute was originally signed by President 
Bill Clinton, the Bush administration ‘unsigned’ the Statute and did not consider themselves 
bound by the previous administrations signature (Bravin, 2008). The United States, as of writing 
this, still has not signed the Rome Statute. 
 
 However, when examining US action in the Ugandan case, the United States seemingly 
gave the Court legitimacy in 2006 when Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, said that the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) must, as ICC indicted war criminals, be 
captured and sent to The Hague. However, a realist perspective would argue that this was done 
by the United States for two reasons, the first being that the LRA began targeting Americans and 
the United States wanted to protect their nationals abroad. The second thing that realists could 
point to would be that during that time Britain had called for action from its neighbors, and that 
the United States was responding to the call from their ally in order to continue the hegemony of 





 While neoliberal institutionalism is similar to realism in the sense that states are the 
central actors involved, it does have a few notable differences that allow the International 
Criminal Court to be examined through a different lens. Reus-Smit (2004) notes that while 
realists view international institutions as a way to achieve objectives for themselves in the pursuit 
of state power, neoliberal institutionalists understand institutions as having the ability to 
influence states even though they are ultimately the creation of states and the inter-state system 
(p. 18). He further argues that states try to achieve utility maximization through collective action 
(p. 18). I argue that this can be illustrated in the Rome Statute insofar as states believed that an 
international rule of law would help solidify international political and legal tensions and would 
align with their own self-interest. 
 
 Similarly, neoliberals argue that institutions could change states’ perspectives on what is 
in their self-interest. Governments are thought to achieve this interest through political influence. 
This political influence, evident during the Rome Statute negotiations, plays a key role in 
understanding why the International Criminal Court is not solely a legal body, but also one that 
emerges from a complex political configuration, involving states but also non-state actors, 
existing international institutions, established norms, principles and decision making procedures. 
While an international rule of law may or may not have been in the self-interest of some states at 
the time of the drafting of the Rome Statute, the newfound institution of the ICC and its ability to 






 Constructivism in International Relations has at its core a focus on normative ideas and 
identities and how they translate into material structures. Furthermore, constructivists argue that 
context must be taken into account, specifically the interactions between states that result in 
modified behavior and patterns. Much emphasis is put on understanding the motives for each 
actor involved, specifically what material structure, such as an international institution, they hope 
to achieve or create through normative ideas or identities and why they want to pursue that 
specific material structure (Reus-Smit, 2004, p. 22). As Reus-Smit (2004) further notes, 
constructivist scholars argue that these material structures are created by shared ideas between 
states, as well as the interests of states (pp. 21-23). Much of the knowledge created from 
structures and international institutions is done through interaction between states, as well as 
understanding the origin of state interests. A constructivist approach is best understood as 
international law being viewed as a social norm, and the ICC can be seen from this perspective 
as expanding out of this social constructed norm of justice.  
 
 Fehl (2004) argues that the developing human rights discourse as a result of the end of 
the Cold War, the Rwandan conflict, and the Balkans war played a large role in how states 
understand the role of prosecution and deterrence through an international court. She also notes 
that states desiring to be in line with the human rights movements focused on having themselves 
viewed as such, which led to the collective ideas of international justice and the development of 
the Court (pp. 358-359). As a result, a constructivist ontology could be used in conjunction with 
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a liberal institutionalist perspective in order to understand how rational state actors pursue utility 
maximization in line with other state actors. States could develop their interests based on the 
interaction with other state actors through the sharing of ideas and the creation of structures to 
maximize the respective utility of all states involved. 
 
 The overview of the three broad International Relations theories discussed allows for the 
placement of the ICC as an international institution within contemporary IR thought. Although 
not the approach taken here, a more careful examination of these theories would allow for a 
comparison between the ICC and other international institutions within this context. Instead, 
what follows will examine six commonly held academic perspectives on the Court, which 




Understanding the Politics of the ICC: Six Scholarly Perspectives 
 
 A survey of the literature on international law reveals five approaches, as well as the 
usage of multiple cases, that highlight some of the political effects of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). The first and second schools of thought encompass the foundational structure and 
power relations within the Court. Adherents of the first school put forth the argument that the 
political nature of the ICC can be traced back to its creation (Gallarotti and Preis 1999; 
Chesterman 2008; Schabas 2007), and proponents of the second school focus on the jockeying 
for power within the Court by its various internal offices (Schiff 2008; Economides 2003). As 
examined at the start of the essay, the third school of thought approaches the question through 
more abstract lenses by analyzing the applicability of International Relations theory and argues 
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that these various theories best show the political implications of the ICC (Reus-Smit 2004; 
Cronin 2002). The fourth school argues that states use the Court to pursue their own interests 
(Cakmak 2006; Hurd 2014; Irving 2014), while the fifth school explores the influence and effect 
that states’ domestic legal systems have on international law (Krever 2013; Franceshet 2004). 
Finally, the sixth school examines the politics of the ICC through analyses of individual court 
cases. Branch (2004) for instance, argues that the case of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda 
best shows the political dimensions the Court has (pp. 22-23), while Dunne and Gifkins (2011) 
focus on the political nature surrounding the Security Council referral to the ICC in Libya (pp. 
524-525). While each of these arguments are strong, this essay maintains that the case based 
approaches, notably those that focus on the Ugandan and Libyan cases, are most convincing. 
This is due to the contemporary nature of the cases, their ability to demonstrate multiple political 
functions of the Court, and the political effects the cases have had both within their respective 
borders, as well as on the international stage. 
 
 Like any scholar who hopes to understand the workings of an institution, many 
academics that study international law and the International Criminal Court understand the 
importance of examining the foundation and construction of the institution and how it shapes its 
contemporary behavior. Scholars that focus on the construction of the ICC argue that the Court’s 
founding and construction lead to the political dynamics and relations we see today. Gallarotti 
and Preis (1999) examine various competing opinions to argue that, while the ICC may be 
considered weak and not immune from politics, the Court’s construction is not the cause of this 
weakness (p.2). They argue that politics and limited autonomy are inescapable for such an 
institution, but they need not be detrimental to the functioning of the ICC as they can be used as 
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a diplomatic weapon to pursue peace and other humanitarian goals on an international stage. As 
Gallarotti and Preis (1999) argue, a Court centered around political issues such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity can utilize political strategies to promote the “spirit of justice” by 
protecting individuals from harm and facilitating resolutions to conflict (p.19). 
 
 Similarly, Chesterman (2008) argues that the rule of law, while already universal on the 
international stage, needs to be defined as a political tool to pursue justice in countries that do not 
follow the rule of law (p.331). Schabas (2007), another international law scholar notes in his 
introductory chapter the similarity of the political elements of the International Criminal 
Tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia created by the UN Security Council, and how these ad hoc 
tribunals were used as a foundation upon which to build the ICC (pp. 13-14). He focuses on the 
problematic notion of primacy.1 The International Law Commission, which played a central role 
in the creation of the Court, sought to borrow this notion from the tribunals. Ultimately, the end 
result was the creation of the principle of complementarity2. Schabas’ focus on the notion of 
primacy and its application in the ad hoc tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia does not 
adequately address the political ramifications of the ICC due to the Court’s adoption of the 
principle of complementarity to replace the use of primacy. However, Schabas does offer a 
thorough examination of the two concepts, as well as the development of the mechanisms used to 
initiate legal investigations by both the tribunals as well as the ICC.  
1 The concept of primacy was used in the ad hoc tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia. This 
concept allowed the temporary tribunals more jurisdiction than the respective domestic courts. 
This resulted in the tribunals having greater authority and power in ruling against criminals in the 
respective states. 
2 Complementarity allows the ICC to initiate or investigate a case when the state is either unable 
to launch an investigation themselves (due to lack of capacity, structure, etc.) or unwilling to 
(with a specific focus on ending impunity in this situation). 
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 The rule of the law is the foundation upon which many legal institutions are built 
throughout the world. Scholars who focus on the rule of law, a staple in the domestic justice 
systems of many states, argue that it can be transferred to the international stage as a way of 
‘domesticating the international’ and ensuring that impunity ends regardless of domestic legal 
systems. Krever (2013) offers a critique of international criminal law and argues that when 
countries intervene in the political economy of other states, it creates conditions for criminal 
activity within the state amongst its most prominent actors. As a result, he argues that 
international criminal law ultimately ignores the factors, such as the intervention by countries 
into the political economy of other states, which shape the environment where criminal behavior 
of individuals emerges. He maintains that reform is needed in regards to interventions into the 
political economy of states so that it ceases to exist as a factor in the creation of international 
criminal behavior. (pp. 703-704).  
  
 Franceschet (2004) offers a more optimistic argument that while the ICC is an example of 
liberal legalism succeeding the Westphalian model, it is a function of changing perceptions of 
how the rule of law relates to global inequalities. He submits that the ICC fills the need that 
states have to criminally prosecute an individual when the host state is incapable of doing it 
itself, and that the rule of law is an effective way to mobilize support for this ideal on the 
international stage (pp. 23-25). Powell (2013) focuses on the legitimacy of the rule of law in 
states and how this in turn affects the legitimacy of the rule of law on the international stage. She 
argues that there is a link between the quality of a state's domestic legal system, specifically the 
rule of law, and perceived legitimacy of an international court (pp.364-365). Countries that have 
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an established rule of law tend to be more accepting of the International Criminal Court (with the 
notable exception of the United States, as well as other prominent non-signatories like Russia, 
China, and Israel). Focusing solely on the rule of law of domestic jurisdictions and how it 
translates into the international does not fully encapsulate the argument of the political 
implications of the ICC. It may show an avenue of the politics that surround the Court by 
focusing on the rule of law and its translation to international institutions and how each 
individual state may have different views of the law practiced at the ICC, but the scope appears 
too narrow to effectively analyze all of the political components of the Court. 
 
 While the ICC may influence state policy, decision-making, and international 
relationships, many states often seek to shape and influence the ICC. Many academics argue that 
in order to best understand the political dynamics of the International Criminal Court, it is 
important to develop an understanding of how states use the Court to pursue their own 
international agenda in regards to humanitarian concerns. Cakmak (2006) examines the ICC in 
three sections focusing on state relations with the Court. First, he argues that the ICC avoids 
violating national sovereignty by not intervening in matters that are tied to the sovereignty of 
states. Secondly, Cakmak argues that the ICC is evidence of a shifting global order, one that is 
no longer “state-centric”. Finally, the author argues that the US opposition to the ICC is 
detrimental to the shift of global order as the US is seen as a global superpower that maintains an 
essential role in global politics (pp. 29-32). Hurd (2014) echoes those sentiments, noting that 
international law is situated in international politics and the respective policies of individual 
states. It is noted that international law cannot simply be reduced to a country’s ability to accept 
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or reject legal commitments on the global stage and that international law needs to shift beyond 
this focus (pp. 39-40). 
 
 Irving (2014) takes a different approach to analyzing state influence on the ICC, steering 
clear of examining state influence on the Court beyond the host state. She focuses on the issue of 
legal jurisdiction for the International Criminal Court and how the host state affects that 
jurisdiction, as well as how the ICC affects the jurisdiction of the host state’s justice system (pp. 
479-481). Irving argues that there are important policy implications that need to be put in place 
to protect the host state from being held responsible for the actions of an international institution 
on their territory (p. 492). I view this as being similar to the role of the United States as one of 
the hosts of the UN. Focusing on state relations and how each individual state may use the Court 
for political reasons does provide a strong argument for the political nature of the Court due to 
the role state agents played in creating the Court. This argument could coincide with specific 
cases and show that the Court both influences, and is influenced, by states and their respective 
actors. 
 
 The ICC is made up of a number of internal offices, such as the Office of the Prosecutor, 
the Registry, and the Pre-Trial Chambers. Many scholars argue that these offices offer the best 
insight into the political implications of the ICC, and how the politics of the Court translates into 
further political dynamics outside of the Court. Schiff (2008) contends that the three offices 
mentioned above are often susceptible to power struggles with each trying to influence the action 
of the Court, which cases to pursue, and the overall direction of the Court. He also highlights that 
the election of the judges was a political process, similar to any election for an official (p. 251). 
 18 
Finally, it is important to note the role of diplomats in creating the offices of the Court and how 
this role was the result of a combination of diplomatic-political and legal activity. 
 
 Similarly, Economides (2003) notes the role that various offices play in bringing to light 
the politics of the Court. However, he expands from internal power struggles within the Court to 
include lobbying when discussing the Office of the Prosecutor. He notes the susceptibility of the 
OTP to outside pressure when it comes to the question of what cases will be pursued (pp. 41-43). 
Economides submits that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can lobby and present to the 
OTP what individuals or states to indict, as evidenced in Schiff’s (2008) piece when he noted 
that at least 1,732 messages were sent to the OTP between the creation of the Court and February 
10th, 2006, claiming crimes had been committed in 139 countries (p.156). The power dynamics 
within the offices of the Court do show that there is jockeying within the ICC for power and 
supremacy when the OTP and the Pre-Trial Chambers (PTC) have differing opinions on what 
cases should be pursued. However, this could be said for many domestic and international court 
systems, and as a result does not provide a strong enough argument to showcase the 
distinctiveness of the political dimensions of the ICC. 
  
 Therefore, the bulk of the analysis of the essay will be focused on exploring the specific 
cases of Uganda and Libya in order to demonstrate distinct functions of the Court; when a state 
is unable, or unwilling, to prosecute an individual in their own domestic courts. Many scholars 
have used Uganda to analyze the politics of the ICC. More recently, scholars have turned their 
attention to the Libyan cases, which were referred to the ICC by the Security Council in 2011. 
Branch (2004) offers a unique analysis in the sense that he examines the Ugandan case by noting 
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the political backlash in response to the first ICC case. He argues that the community of victims 
in the northern part of Uganda was against the ICC’s investigation into Joseph Kony’s militia 
group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) because they were more concerned about efforts 
centered around peace, rather than those centered on justice that were seemingly the focus of the 
ICC (pp. 24-25). He argues that the people it is aiming to serve must guide the ICC and that local 
justice must be prioritized over international justice. 
 
 Examining Libya, Dunne and Gifkins (2011) explore the Responsibility to Protect agenda 
and how it applied to Libya. They argue that further examination of the Libyan case is warranted 
due to the fact that the US voted in favor of referring the case to the ICC. Given the US’s record 
of strong opposition to the Court, the authors maintain that Washington’s vote in favor of 
Security Council referral signifies the importance of an investigation into Libya and the ICC’s 
pursuit of those accused of committing crimes against humanity. The US vote in favor of a 
referral to a Court that they do not recognize themselves demonstrates a belief in the usefulness 
of the Court in some situations and regions of the globe (pp. 524-525).  They demonstrate some 
of the political effects Libya has had on the Court, and in turn, some of the political effects the 
indictment of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi has had on Libya and the prospect for political stability in 
the post Gaddafi era.  
 
 Combining the schools of thought examined above with a close examination of the cases 
of Uganda and Libya offers a balanced look at the political effects of the ICC. The work of 
scholars who are concerned with the development and creation of the Court and its respective 
agents can be used and applied to an analysis of the cases of Uganda and Libya. Other authors 
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offer explanations that do not necessarily focus strictly on the ICC, but examine international 
institutions as a whole, such as Cronin and his analysis of the UN, or offer a unilateral analysis of 
a state’s influence on the Court, such as Irving’s focus on the role played by the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, studying the ICC through the lens of IR helps demonstrate the politics surrounding 
the Court in the cases of Uganda and Libya. As a result, the politics of the ICC and the resulting 
implications are evident by analyzing the theory and facts of these two unique cases.  Before 
diving into these cases, however, more background work must be done in order to better 
understand the unique relationship between law and politics, as well as how the creation of the 
Court offers insight into the politics surrounding the ICC, and also the internal power dynamics 
between the various offices in the Court. 
 
The Developing Relationship Between Law and Politics 
 
 While the studies of law and politics have long been intertwined, the creation of the ICC 
has legal and political experts shifting towards developing a better understanding of the 
relationship between their respective fields. This can be examined in the two unique cases of 
Uganda and Libya and how the ICC has developed both politically and legally through these 
examples. As indicated previously, an examination of various International Relations theory can 
also aid in explaining the politics enmeshed in the Court and international law as a whole. The 
historical context and development of international law, specifically the world’s most prominent 
judicial body, the ICC, must first be explored to develop a foundational understanding of how 
the international system works today as a mix of competing political and legal values.  
 
 21 
 The two conflicts at the end of the 20th century are often viewed as the beginning of the 
new relationship between humanitarian law and politics that we see manifested today. With both 
the war in the Balkans and Rwanda, Western observers, politicians, and media immediately 
attached the label of ‘genocide’, as well as coined a new term, ‘ethnic cleansing’, to describe the 
atrocities committed during these conflicts. With these terms being used prominently for the first 
time since the Second World War, international political institutions and actors, such as states, 
NGOs, and other organizations dedicated to upholding human rights, had a keen interest in 
ending the conflict and ensuring those who were perpetuating these atrocities were brought to 
justice. With the domestic legal institutions unable to fulfill their legal duties in the respective 
countries’ current state of affairs, the United Nations’ Security Council stepped in, and within 
their mandate of ensuring peace and security in the world, passed Resolutions 827 and 955 in 
1993 and 1994 respectively in order to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). These tribunals 
were set up in an ad hoc manner in order to bring individuals and groups responsible for these 
violations of international humanitarian law to trial, and ultimately prosecute them for gross 
violations of humanitarian law.  
  
 Scholars have recognized the unique role in which the law attempts to constrain the 
power of political actors through a unique paradoxical tie between the two. Laws are created 
through political processes, but laws also restrict the power and politics that led to their 
inception. It soon became apparent that with the development of an International Criminal Court 
that power relations would change and similar to domestic political and legal institutions, politics 
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and the law would have conflicting objectives, as evidenced in the peace versus justice debates in 
the following cases.  
 
Political Dynamics within the Foundation of the Court 
 
 The ad hoc tribunals had mixed results, with many individuals being prosecuted for the 
crimes they committed, however, these courts also faced the challenge of capturing and bringing 
to trial high profile officials. This meant that some individuals who had “political capital” or 
were prominent politically were able to evade justice, and as Schiff (2008) notes, there were 
concerns amongst observers that Prosecutor Richard Goldstone’s methodical prosecution 
strategy would lead to some individuals avoiding justice due to their political stance (p. 52). 
Even before the creation of the ICC, this protection shows the beginning of politics mixing with 
the legal process in international prosecutions. Individuals who were to be tried for their war 
crimes or crimes against humanity were able to escape prosecution due to their political status. 
Much of the success of the Tribunals hinged on the cooperation of local governments due to the 
need to respect state sovereignty, and if these governments did not fully cooperate, or chose to 
protect certain individuals, much of the legal process for justice was circumvented by political 
objectives and power. 
 
 When beginning the negotiations of the Rome Statute, states wanted to remember the 
problems that the Tribunals had faced in their pursuit of justice, while also developing a political 
and legal institution to achieve international justice. A key point of the Statute negotiations was 
the importance to protect state sovereignty, while also ensuring that this sovereignty could not be 
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used as a shield against a Court-led investigation in order to protect individuals in a country. As a 
result, the key principle of complementarity was worked into the Statute. Complementarity 
focused on allowing the Court to only proceed if the state was unable or unwilling to prosecute 
an individual or group (Stigen, 2008, pp.1-2). I argue that, while this principle of 
complementarity helps protect state sovereignty, it does not help protect the Court from the 
political ramifications that exist as a result of the Ugandan and Libyan cases. 
 
 The Rome Statute also gives the Security Council the power to refer cases to the ICC. It 
can also suspend the activities of the Court within individual states where it was entrusted to 
investigate possible crimes, but this is only permitted when the investigation threatens the peace 
of a region, and only if the Security Council adopts a resolution to this effect. Such a resolution 
would require the support or abstention of the P5 members. Having this mechanism built into the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court heightens the political nature of the Court itself and 
how it conducts its investigations. Over the past decade we have seen the Security Council 
susceptible to political whims amongst its member states, notably the United States when it 
threatened to withhold its dues to the UN if there was a chance those funds would be furnished 
by way of a loan or aid to the ICC (United Nations SC/8351, 2005). With states susceptible to 
political practices within the Council, it also leads to an extension of those political practices 
when the Security Council wishes to refer a case to the ICC. This will be examined further when 
focusing on the case of Libya.  
 
 When the Security Council refers a case to the ICC, the Court claims primacy over the 
jurisdiction in the state when, as mentioned above, a state is either unable or unwilling to pursue 
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an investigation. This has political ramifications, which are best examined when studying the 
case of the government of Sudan, who refused the investigation on the grounds of maintaining 
the integrity and sovereignty of the Sudanese state. When this happens, the Security Council can 
authorize enforcement measures. It is clear that both the ICC and the Security Council are having 
difficulty maintaining the balance between the justice and the political value of state sovereignty 
when a country such as Sudan initially rejects an investigation but still finds itself in the midst of 
one. The freedom that each individual country maintains as a core pillar of their sovereignty 
must be respected by international institutions, especially those institutions where the state in 
question did not ratify the statute in order for it to become binding on them and their actions.  
 
Internal Power Dynamics of the ICC 
 
 There is similar evidence of political calculations surrounding the Court even within its 
internal structure and division of labor. The Rome Statute outlines that the judges of the Court 
must be elected for terms of nine years. With the election of judges comes the inevitable 
campaigning for the position, as well as the need to take a position on various issues facing the 
Court in order to distinguish the candidate. As with any election, politics come in to play in order 
to hold and maintain power. Schiff (2008) further notes the election of judges depended more on 
“campaigning, bargaining, and vote trading, than on the issue-or experience-based characteristics 
of the candidates” (p.107). 
 
 The internal offices of the Court are broken down into three sections: the Office of the 
Prosecutor, the Pre-Trial Chambers, and the Registry, which leads to a differing visions for the 
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direction of the Court. There is a constant power struggle between the Chief Prosecutor, who 
undergoes the same political appointment as the justices, and the Pre-Trial Chambers, who may 
have their own aims and ideas for the direction of the Court. Judges are often concerned with the 
slow process of the Court and attempt to speed up the process in order to help victims faster. The 
Prosecutor can also take initiative to pursue what he or she deems as politically and legally 
feasible and start an investigation through a method called proprio motu, which allows the 
Prosecutor to initiate an investigation into a country without it being referred by the country 
itself or the Security Council. Granted, this has a check attached to it in that the Pre-Trial 
Chambers must approve it. However, the Office of the Prosecutor retains political components 
due to the sheer ability it has to use proprio motu to select cases it wants to pursue, rather than 
solely allowing other bodies like the state in question or the Security Council refer matters to the 
Court. 
 
 Political tensions between the three offices are built directly into the Statute. The offices, 
which seek to serve as a system for checks and balances within the Court, add to the politics that 
surround the institution exemplified in the election and appointment of officials, and the ability 
of the OTP to use proprio motu. With competing aims between offices, the ICC faces internal 
challenges in their quest for justice beyond the political calculations that arise from state 
investigations. The Court’s goal of justice and ending impunity for crimes against humanity is 






Understanding Political Dynamics of the Court Through Cases 
 
 African countries have been featured prominently in the early function of the ICC and the 
cases it pursues. Many have criticized this aspect of the Court, arguing that it needs to broaden 
its focus and widen the scope of cases and individuals brought to the Court. This highlights an 
example of the political aspects of the International Criminal Court as compared to judicial 
systems found within states. This is clear when examining the prominence of African states in 
the Court’s docket, which include cases pursued by Security Council and national government 
referrals. Tadli (2009) argues that the emphasis on African cases being brought to the Court 
through the Security Council demonstrates the common critique of the Court in that it is a tool of 
the West to promote values, and desired political results in the region such as the end of conflict 
and development of the area for investment (p. 58). It also speaks to the perception that the ICC 
is a political tool for Western imperialism, exercising control over African subjects (pp. 59-60). 
Tadli (2009) goes even further in emphasizing that the ICC is seen by many as shifting away 
from a post-colonialist world and moving towards further Western hegemony in the region (p. 
66).  
 
 Beyond the politics of the Court itself and how it functions, specific cases outline 
political effects that result in states as a result of an ICC investigation. These effects are evident 
in the cases of Uganda and Libya. As a state party to the Rome Statute, Uganda was a case of 
self-referral. It managed to avoid the political issues that Libya has faced as a non-state party and 
its subsequent referral by the Security Council. However, the Court had effects on the state of 
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Uganda and Libya, with the latter being effected in its state building through the dual pursuit of 
justice and peace, a difficult balance for the ICC to maintain in both countries. One of the key 
challenges of the Court when it deals with cases is to adhere to a key principal of judiciaries 
around the world: impartiality. When the ICC seeks to pursue a case, they must remain impartial 
on political issues related to peace, and focus on justice. In the investigation of Uganda, the 
Court had difficulty in maintaining its impartiality. This was evident when the President of 
Uganda and the Chief Prosecutor issued a join statement for the referral of the situation to the 
ICC in January of 2004, which heightened the concerns that the international community had in 
regards to the impartiality of the Court by appearing to side with the Ugandan government at the 
beginning of the investigation (Allen, 2006, n.p.)  
 
 In the following section, the cases of Uganda and Libya will be examined in depth. 
Specifically, attention will be paid to the political components that can be teased out of the 
background of each conflict and the resulting referrals, as well as the internal political 
ramifications of both cases for the ICC and the two states in question.   
 
Uganda: The Politics of Peace versus the Justice of the Law 
  
 The conflict in Uganda has a long history, dating back to colonial times with northern 
groups fighting against southern groups over religious and economic differences (Kastner, 2012, 
pp. 19-20). As a result of these differences, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph 
Kony, a self appointed spiritual and military leader was formed in the later 19th century. Allen 
(2006) highlights that the LRA began to kidnap children as “recruits”, as well as use them for 
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soldiers, laborers, and slaves (n.p.). The Ugandan government sought to protect civilians from 
the militia group by setting up camps, but these camps, housing internally displaced persons, 
quickly came under attack from the LRA. The Sudanese government offered its support to the 
group but the support quickly subsided and stopped all together shortly after the United States 
government labeled the LRA as a terrorist group in December of 2001.  
 
 At the start of the 21st century, the LRA was slowly loosing ground with some members 
accepting amnesty from the government. As a result, the government attacked the remaining 
forces in hopes of destroying the LRA altogether. However, the government campaign failed and 
the LRA resumed its attacks and atrocities in northern Uganda. Many observers estimate that the 
LRA abducted approximately 38,000 children, and more relevant, 12,000 after the Rome Statute 
came into effect. Insecurity has led to reduced farming, trading, and schooling, which have 
caused the Ugandan economy to decline (Schiff, 2008, p. 198).   
 
 Ugandan lawyers had informal conversations with ICC personnel about the possibility of 
referring the LRA and Joseph Kony to the Court. Near the end of 2003, President Museveni sent 
a confidential letter to The Hague to formally refer the matter to the Court. Museveni and Chief 
Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo offered strong joint statements focusing on apprehending and 
bringing Kony and his leadership to trial that, as previously alluded to, made it appear that 
Ocampo was not remaining impartial at the start of the investigation. It was noted in the media 
that both resolved to work with other states and international institutions, and that the Court 
could not capture and try the responsible individuals by itself (Price, 2014, n.p.). Furthermore, 
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Sudanese officials announced afterwards that they would comply with the ICC’s investigation as 
a result of Uganda’s referral.  
 
 However, President Museveni had clear political objectives he hoped to achieve as a 
result of the referral to the Court. By calling on the ICC to investigate, Museveni could shift the 
international community’s attention away from the poor governance and actions of his military 
in the conflict, the Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (Branch, 2007, p. 181). With a similar 
focus, his call on the ICC could help legitimatize his government in the eyes of the international 
community. Museveni desired this in hopes that it would stir the developed world into providing 
aid for his victimized country. Schiff (2008) makes reference to the carrot and the stick analogy 
to demonstrate Museveni’s wavering commitment to the ICC and its objectives (p. 199). The 
President hoped that the mere threat of the Court would bring the LRA to the negotiating table as 
the carrot, and the simultaneous calling for Kony’s prosecution as the stick.  
 
 The internal political dynamics within the Court were apparent when examining the role 
of the Chief Prosecutor in the Ugandan case. While the Chief Prosecutor did not use his proprio 
motu power to initiate an investigation on his own accord, his role within the case still carried 
political elements. Ocampo had been analyzing the situation in Uganda since 2002 in the hopes 
of using the power of the ICC to investigate the militia in the country. Branch (2007) argues that 
the ICC chose the Ugandan case as it was politically pragmatic despite its mandate to pursue 
justice rather than choosing cases based on political reasons (p.180) Furthermore, Ocampo’s 
decision to wait until January 29th, 2004 was based on the political reasoning of improving the 
legitimacy of the ICC in the eyes of the international community by promoting cooperation 
 30 
between states parties. In Ocampo’s preliminary research into the case of the LRA in 2002, he 
would have been aware of the crimes against humanity committed by the LRA during this time 
period. Instead of recognizing the criminal behavior of the organization and pursuing the arrest 
and detainment of the individuals, some maintain that he waited for an opportune, politically 
beneficial time to pursue an investigation with the cooperation of the Ugandan government. In 
this case, he prioritized political legitimacy over a strict pursuit of legal justice. To expand, 
Ocampo had the opportunity to initiate an investigation into the LRA well before when he 
actually did. This highlights the fact that the ICC faces a different set of political calculations and 
questions than a domestic criminal justice faces. A domestic criminal justice system is able to 
refrain from political calculations, while the ICC is unable to. This is because it is entrenched in 
the politics of an inter-state system that it hopes to investigate. While aiming to pursue justice, 
the Court cannot escape the politics surrounding the investigations it pursues. This is an example 
of how the ICC is different in practice than domestic legal frameworks, and how it faces 
difficulty in truly domesticating the international.   
 
 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also play a key role in the political dynamics of 
the ICC. They play a unique role in the Court as both lobbyists for what they would like to see 
pursued, as well as players in helping achieve the Court’s mandate. NGOs add a political 
dynamic to the Court in this sense, as they have political objectives that they would like to see 
achieved through the Court. In the case of Uganda, as well as in other cases before the ICC, one 
of the main goals of international NGOs is the end to impunity for crimes against humanity. 
However, it must be done without the appearance of being partial to one side over the other. In 
Uganda, Ocampo appearing with President Museveni came off as favoring the government’s 
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position over the LRA. This highlights a key political dynamic in the example of optics. Within a 
purely legal body, solely law governs the concern of optics and how things may or may not 
appear partial to one side. However, within the ICC, NGOs have highlighted the importance of 
how things are perceived by the international community and the resulting political 
ramifications. Furthermore, NGOs have pursued their own political objectives in the case of 
Uganda. With the main goal of NGOs being primarily driven by humanitarian concerns, they 
have advocated for a humanitarian approach and an end to conflict over other results (Schiff, 
2008, p. 195). This speaks to their desire to achieve what they deem as a desirable political 
outcome for themselves as well as for the people involved.  
 
 Within the ICC’s investigation into the Ugandan case, there was much focus on the 
debate of peace versus justice, and if they could both be achieved in the region. This relationship 
required a balancing act in Uganda, and highlights an important political dynamic of the Court. 
Peace must be weighed against justice through concerns for child soldiers and other victims of 
the LRA’s reign in Uganda. Specifically, the ICC as an international institution with political 
support and political behaviors has the ability to look past the legal sphere and understand the 
ramifications that are felt by citizens and victims as well as help pursue a political plan for peace. 
  
 It is necessary to note the importance of countering impunity within the Rome Statute, 
and how this should lead to an end of crimes against humanity. In other words, the judicial-based 
absence of impunity should aid the political-based peace. However, in the case of Uganda, the 
politically charged peace efforts often prevented justice. President Museveni continually argued 
that if the LRA would negotiate with the government he would suspend the ICC’s investigation. 
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Museveni’s desire for peace in the country, a political matter, outweighed his desire for LRA 
leadership to be tried and held accountable by the ICC, a judicial matter. The non-judicial 
political dynamics built into the Court, specifically the ability to lift arrest warrants, allowed the 
Ugandan government to offer political impunity to the LRA by offering to have the arrest 
warrants removed so they could avoid justice in exchange for the end of the conflict. These 
political dynamics are in stark contrast to some of the aims of the ICC that were touched on at 
the beginning of the essay, such as the end of impunity, and the irrelevance of official capacity. 
 
 Furthermore, after the preliminary inquiry into Uganda and the conflict, which continued 
on, citizens began to distrust not only the government but also the ICC itself. It had become a 
political issue through its involvement in the sense that its investigation polarized advocates and 
opponents. Interestingly enough, the Chief Prosecutor issued a statement with Ugandan leaders 
to, among other things, achieve justice and rebuild communities, while simultaneously calling on 
other stakeholders in the international community to cooperate. This is significant because it 
shows the political nature of the OTP tied in with a focus on a legal issue; in October of 2005, 
Ocampo issued a statement calling for justice in the region, but also mixing this with a call for 
political peace. Ocampo wanted to move forward with peace. On the face of it, the statement was 
issued to ease concerns of NGOs and other international actors of the conflict concerned with the 
LRA’s escalation of violence since the ICC got referred to the matter, and the possibility of 
justice taking priority over peace in the country. However, the statement resembled a speech 
made by other international institutions like the UN. The core of the message was not to promote 
justice through the Court, but to reassure outsiders that the Court was addressing the political 
concern of peace in the region, through aligning itself with the Ugandan government. The 
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statement was a calculated political move to maintain international legitimacy during the 
investigation. It was not done according to strict legal standards, and as such offers a niche 
example of a political move done by an international legal body. One could argue that it 
highlights how launching criminal prosecutions in the context of an international criminal court 
unavoidably brings to the fore the continued presence of political calculations, which in the 
context of the legal standards of a domestic criminal justice system would be considered 
unacceptable. 
 
 In addition to the peace versus justice debate surrounding it, the Ugandan case has further 
elements that demonstrate the political dynamics of the International Criminal Court. The issuing 
of arrest warrants had political ramifications in that the LRA members who had warrants issued 
for their arrest, had no incentive to come forward and end the violence as that would lead to their 
trial and possibility of internment. According to the Rome Statute the arrest warrants are to be 
issued on the basis of evidence and not conditional on future circumstances (Souaré, 2009, p. 
379). In the case of Uganda, the Pre-Trial Chamber wanted to be certain that the OTP would not 
circumvent the Statute’s articles on arrest warrants and not have them used as a bargaining tool 
or rescinded in the future for peace in the region.  
 
 Further examining the Office of the Prosecutor leads to the realization that it became 
susceptible to political attack from advocates for both peace and justice, with each side trying to 
lobby Ocampo into a decision to pursue or defer indictments. In this sense, the politics of this 
decision show that the Court is susceptible to the mood and opinion of the people, much like 
other domestic political bodies and institutions. Furthermore, the peace process was slowed 
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down in order to pursue justice through the ICC. The lengthy process highlights the difficulty for 
the ICC to maintain a balance between pursuing its agenda of international legal justice and the 
concerns for victims and the peace of the region.  
 
Libya: A Contemporary Challenge for the Court In A Shifting Political Landscape 
 
 Nearly a decade after the ICC investigation into Uganda, the Court was drawn to a new 
conflict brought about by the Arab Spring in 2011, which led to further investigation into the 
Gaddafi regime in Libya. As discussed above, with the Ugandan case, the matter was referred to 
the ICC by the national government. However, in the case of Libya, the Court was given its 
mandate to investigate through a referral by the UN Security Council, which will be examined 
for its own political dynamics. However, it is important to understand the background of the 
Libyan conflict in order to better understand how the details of the civil war and the Gaddafi 
regime led the ICC to take on a political role in the proceedings. The ICC’s cases in Libya 
became enmeshed in matters concerned with state building, competing claims to government, 
and uncertainty surrounding the legal proceedings, which will be discussed below. 
 
 Similar to other conflicts that began during the Arab Spring, there was dissatisfaction 
among the people with the regime in Tripoli. In February of 2011, popular protests against the 
regime reached a turning point when Libyan government forces fired on the public. The focus of 
the protest changed from demanding reform, to attempting to overthrow the government. As a 
result, a group of Libyan opposition forces rose up in an attempt to overthrow the government of 
Muammar Gaddafi and his military regime. However, it was not simply a military coup. The 
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National Transitional Council (NTC) was created during the civil war as a political face of the 
revolution in an attempt to help the post-Gaddafi political transition. This is an important 
distinction between the Libyan case and the Ugandan case. In the case of Libya, the opposition 
militia was not the cause of the ICC investigation like the LRA. Rather, it was the former 
government that was accused of crimes against humanity. This is key to point out because the 
same political critiques of the ICC trying to pursue peace along with the government in Uganda 
do not apply to Libya. However, there are still political effects that emerge with the Libyan ICC 
cases, but these effects are not tied to the same issues of balancing political peace and protection 
of citizens with international justice.  
 
 The United Nations Security Council, charged with upholding international peace and 
security, recognized the growing international support for an intervention in Libya, and passed 
Resolution 1973 which supported military intervention in the form of a no-fly zone over the 
country without the consent of the Gaddafi regime, which was passed with important abstentions 
by P5 members Russia and China, as well as non-permanent states Brazil, Germany, and India. 
However, more importantly was Resolution 1970 and the unanimous referral by the Security 
Council of the Libyan case to the International Criminal Court3. This marked the second time 
since its inception that the Security Council referred an issue to the Court, the case of Sudan 
being the first. Resolution 1970, among other things, deplored the mass violations of human 
3 Resolution 1970, operative clause 3: Decides to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; 
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rights committed by the Gaddafi regime4 as well as recognized the support of the African Union 
and Arab League5.  
  The UN Security Council recognized the important role that the ICC could play in the 
situation. Believing that a NATO-led coalition could handle the military aspect of the conflict, 
the Security Council, by calling on the Court to prepare an investigation, understood the 
importance of holding individuals accountable crimes under IHL, as referenced in Resolution 
1970. It is important to note that Libya, as a UN member, is bound by the resolution as stated in 
article 25 of the UN Charter and must allow for the ICC to investigate. What needs to be 
highlighted here is the fact that Libya is not party to the Rome Statute, but as a member of the 
United Nations, they must abide by all resolutions passed by the Security Council, even when it 
refers the issue to a body the state does not recognize.  
 
 Libya not being party to the Rome Statute yet still being bound by the workings of the 
International Criminal Court is problematic for them as a state. In the post-Gaddafi era, Libya 
originally viewed themselves as bound to the Security Council resolution that referred the matter 
to the ICC. Libya worked with the Court even though they had never signed on to it. While this 
does not directly demonstrate the politics enmeshed in the Court, it speaks to the political 
ramifications that Libya has felt as a result of the Security Council referral. Chief among these 
ramifications is the sense in which Libya was bound to cooperate with an institution they 
4 Preambulatory clause: Deploring the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including 
the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and 
rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population 
made from the highest level of the Libyan government, 
5 Preambulatory clause: Welcoming the condemnation by the Arab League, the African Union, 
and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law that are being 
committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
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opposed under the Gaddafi regime, and remained skeptical during the initial launch of the 
investigation as they attempted to move towards a more politically stable country. With the case 
of Uganda, the self-referral negated the potential for the violation of Ugandan sovereignty; they 
freely chose to allow the ICC to investigate the LRA (with both the government and the ICC 
having political reasons to do so as discussed previously).  
  
 However, again noting that Libya was not a party to the ICC and thus not accepting of its 
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, or directly susceptible to the power of the Court to 
initiate an investigation in the state, the investigation was initiated in a way that circumvented 
Libya’s ability to freely accept or reject a non-state body intervening in state affairs. 
Furthermore, this disregard for Libyan sovereignty is also in contrast to one of the mandates of 
the Court, which is to pursue justice through the principle of complementarity.  The Libyan 
government showed that they were both ‘able’ and ‘willing’ to prosecute both Saif Gaddafi and 
al-Senussi, the two key conditions that underpin the principle of complementarity. However, it 
was decided that al-Senussi could be tried in Libya while Gaddafi was to be tried at the ICC, an 
apparent contradiction. While the Court presented reasoning for this at the time, political issues, 
such as the ability to investigate during an ongoing crisis and the ability to procure Gaddafi from 
rebel detainment may have contributed to the varying approaches between alleged perpetrators 
(Bo, 2014, p. 516). This demonstrates the Court’s determination to achieve justice in the case, 
but by doing so it ignored the key political factors stated previously that are essential to both 
Libya as a state, and the functioning of the Court.  
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 When members of the Security Council refer a matter to the ICC, they too have their own 
political factors that must be examined, albeit briefly. The Libyan case was referred to the ICC in 
large part due to the lack of hard opposition it received in the Security Council and the public 
perception towards stabilizing the region. With the unanimous passing of Resolution 1970, it is 
clear that states on the Council were in agreement on the importance of Libya. However, critics 
of both the Security Council but more so the ICC point out that the conflict in Syria is just as 
pressing as the Libyan crisis. While admittedly there are some important distinctions between 
these conflicts, many view the difference as tied to the contending political objectives and 
alliances of some members of the Security Council. When a state is not party to the Rome 
Statute, and the Security Council cannot refer a matter to the Court due to political reasons, the 
ICC becomes susceptible to the same political gridlock that the Security Council experiences. 
Rather than being able to pursue justice when the gravity of a situation demands it, the ICC may 
be unable to act due to the political dynamics among Council members. This political gridlock 
can be viewed when examining the debate surrounding the ability of the P5 to utilize their veto 
to block a resolution that is against their wishes. Council stalemates also emerge from the 
differing world views of member states. Further, Kersten (2014) highlights an important piece of 
information hidden within Resolution 1970: it refers the Libyan investigation after February 15th, 
2011 (p. 156). This is relevant to the politics surrounding the situation because it effectively 
‘protects’ Security Council members from their involvement with the Gaddafi regime before that 
referral date. While ultimately the matter was referred to the ICC, the members of the Security 
Council, utilizing their referral power in a manner that protects their own interests, is another 
level of the aura of politics that surrounds the functioning of the Court, beyond simply justice.  
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 As was the case in Uganda, the ICC’s investigation into Libya could be argued as one-
sided, even though it was not initiated through a self-referral. In the conflict, some Western 
powers, such as NATO, and other national and international actors including key Arab allies 
such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait supported the Libyan rebels. The rebels 
were made out to be the “right” side of the war. However, as seen in the Ugandan case, it is 
problematic for the Court to view one side as being “right” and the other side being “wrong”. In 
order for justice to be reached, the politics of the situation must be removed, and any perception 
of bias must be ignored. As Kersten (2014) points out, the Court, by issuing indictments and 
warrants for the arrest of individuals, reaffirms the narrative that there is in fact a “right” or a 
“good” side by virtue of not being indicted (p. 161). This changes the perception of the situation 
in the eyes of international actors, and has the potential of lending political legitimacy to one side 
of the conflict over the other. While the ICC cannot simply avoid entering a conflict due to this 
problem, it does show an element of the political context which necessarily accompanies the 
Court’s cases. 
 
 Much like the Ugandan case, there have been concerns with Libya and the Courts 
involvement, specifically how it will alter the path to peace as well as justice. In fact, the balance 
between peace and justice in Libya is even more important than it was in Uganda due to the 
toppling of an established government regime, and the statebuilding efforts by the United 
Nations following the fall of Gaddafi. The ICC has played a political part in the statebuilding of 
Libya as it has attempted to negotiate with one of the groups that claim legitimacy in hopes of 
securing Saif Gaddafi for trial at The Hague. Furthermore, the Court has recognized the inherent 
shift of the situation with Saif to a more political than legal focus. This became evident when, in 
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order to try Gaddafi at the ICC, the Court had to negotiate for his release with a rebel group. This 
negotiation outlines a political function rather than a clear legal mandate, such as a standard 
issuance of arrest warrants. As a result, those involved with the ICC have attempted to maintain 
the Court’s focus on judicial issues by appealing to other states and international institutions to 
aid in the negotiation for Saif. Some proponents have even suggested that the Security Council 
play a larger role in the mediating process when situations shift to more political issues, 
especially in instances of non-compliance (Ferstman et. al, 2014, p. 9). This showcases that the 
Court, while still a political body, has recognized the problems associated with it and is taking 
steps to ensure the politics surrounding the Court are limited. 
 
 Roach (2013) echoes these views by arguing that the ICC would have gained an 
advantage in consulting with other political bodies on Libya. He argues that in doing so the 
Court would have aided in the quest for justice by avoiding making similar mistakes in regards to 
the political peace process in Uganda (p. 509). Further, the ICC affected the attitudes and 
perceptions of parties involved in the political processes of war and peace. By getting involved in 
the conflict, the ICC changed the rebels’ willingness to negotiate with Muammar Gaddafi as they 
felt the ICC would ensure he was brought to justice (Kersten, 2014, p. 161). This demonstrates 
an unintended political effect of the Court’s involvement in that it may have prolonged the 
political negotiations between parties towards peace. With the ICC’s involvement having vast 
political ramifications in the case of Libya, this has led authors such as Roach (2013) to lose faith 
in the credibility of the Court. This is due to its lack of strategy to administer justice that reaches 





 As the sole point of analysis, IR theory is limited in its scope of attempting to understand 
the politics surrounding the ICC. However, this essay has utilized three of these theories, realism, 
neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism, in order to demonstrate how the ICC is situated 
in the study of International Relations and how it behaves like an international political 
institution rather than solely as a legal body.  
 
 This essay, while specifically focusing on the International Criminal Court, is grounded 
in the unique relationship between law and politics and how this dependent relationship is played 
out in various arenas both domestic and international. Although not discussed enough to produce 
a conclusion on how this unique relationship is played out at the ICC, this essay has shown that 
politics are enmeshed with the law at the international level, and it is important to note the 
paradoxical relationship between the two, how politics is responsible for creating the law but at 
the same time the law constricts the power of politics.  
 
 Unique to the ICC is the evidence of politics in both the creation of the Court, as well as 
the internal dynamics between the differing Offices of the Court. This essay has argued that even 
in the drafting of the Rome Statute, there has been evidence of politics enmeshed with the law 
through the negotiation of the Court’s founding document between both diplomats and legal 
experts. Further, these politics can be seen in multiple instances within the functioning of the 
Court itself, such as the political elections of judges or the competing aims and goals that the 
OTP and PTC have. 
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 However, this essay has shown that while there is a vast amount of varying academic 
ideas surrounding the politics of the Court, the most adequate way to examine it is through an 
exploration of real-world cases and investigations that demonstrate the politics enmeshed in the 
ICC. The cases of Uganda and Libya, chosen to demonstrate the unique referral processes to the 
Court and how a self-referral and Security Council referral result in differing political 
calculations of the Court, exemplified the politics enmeshed in the ICC in real-world situations. 
A recurring focus between the two cases is that of peace versus justice, and how the ICC, while 
attempting to pursue justice, ultimately is unable to escape from the peace process during their 
investigation of politically unstable states.  
   
 While for some scholars the International Criminal Court is a step towards universal 
justice and equality, for others it is simply another institution that is at the whim of power 
politics played by states on the international stage. However, the Court is in fact as much of a 
political body as it is a legal body. This is in large part due to the foundation, structure, and 
development of the ICC by not only legal experts, but by politicians and diplomats. These 
individuals created a Court that fits into the notion of global governance. A political Court is best 
viewed when using cases to examine both the academic and applied political principles, and 
Uganda and Libya offer traditional yet contemporary evidence of the political dynamics of the 
ICC. As the Court continues to widen its scope and grow its mandate, so too will the political 
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